The Financial Crisis: Understanding the Causes

February 11, 2009

 Many people know and hear about the recession, but do not understand how we got to this point. This post seeks to provide a concise high-level account of the key factors contributing to the downturn.

The current financial crisis has been the focus of nearly all media attention, policy debate, and popular conversation for the past five months. Both the depth and ferocity of the downturn makes this a truly historic time, and the decisions made to solve the crisis will have an enduring impact on both our financial system and national economy. In order to frame these discussions properly, it is important to have an understanding of what happened and how we got to this point.

The Housing Bubble: The root cause of the crisis can be traced back to the burst of the housing bubble, which began by most estimates in early 2006. The build-up of the bubble was, like all bubbles, based on the façade of massive profit with little regard to risk. Banks were offering the now famous NINJA loans (no income, no job, no assets) to people who were at a high risk to default, and sub-prime mortgages swiftly became the norm. These banks were chasing the enormous profits inherent in bulk loans, but with shockingly little regard to the enormous risk they were taking on. When the bubble finally burst, and no one was able to pay their mortgages, the banks got stuck with all of the bad debt you now hear so much about.

Wall Street Doubles Down:  Behind the scenes of the mortgage defaults was wide spread investment in complex financial instruments called Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Essentially, a CDO is a type of asset-backed security–a bond backed by a mortgage in this case. The problem with CDOs is that the originators of the loan retain no risk for the poor loans they make, but still collect the interest on those loans. Simply put, a bank would make a sub-prime loan, give the mortgage risk to an investor (passing the risk to the investor), and still collect the loan payments.

With housing shooting through the roof in the early 2000s, Wall Street investors invested heavily in CDOs, essentially doubling down the risk on the sub-prime mortgages. This was all exacerbated by mismanaged rating from credit agencies, who undervalued the risk inherent in these complex financial instruments. The bottom line is that Wall Street doubled down on the heavy risk the banks were already taking. Everyone wanted the profit grab from the bubble, and nobody seemed to care about the risk.

The Bubble Bursts: When you loan people money who shouldn’t be loaned money, they will default. Millions of people were given mortgages $100,000 to $200,000 more than they could actually afford, and eventually they weren’t able to pay. Finally, the housing bubble burst. When this happened, revenue the banks had relied upon from mortgage payments and interest was no longer there, and Wall Street’s CDO investments all crumbled almost overnight. With commercial banks struggling to cover losses, and Wall Street investment banks taking hits from CDOs and mortgages, the market began to collapse quickly.

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Credit Crunch: The massive losses in both commercial and investment banks created a classic credit crunch, meaning that banks were unwilling and unable to loan money out to investors and consumers. Since credit forms the basis for much of the market’s function, the freeze meant a halt to nearly all significant investment. Essentially, banks now had to pay for the risks they had taken, so they could not afford to loan out any money. The lending system forms the foundation for our economy, so a credit and liquidity crisis meant a full stop to investment and growth.

Consumer Fear: The sharp downturn decimated millions of 401(k)s and portfolios, and brought fear into the marketplace. Consumer spending declined sharply as people worried about job loss and their rapidly shrinking portfolios, and justifiabily sought to save to cover losses. Consumer confidence reached a 30 year low at the end of 2008 and job loss accelerated quickly in a stalling economy (2.6 million lost in 2008 alone). Combine low confidence, falling wealth (from investments), and massive job loss, and the economy moves rapidly into a classic recession.

A Vicious Cycle: Unfortunately, as you can see from the chart, we are in a terrible cycle. Recession and job loss only further accelerate mortgage defaults, which fuel the credit crisis and so on.

-Matt Benchener from TruPolitics.net

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Walking a Dangerous Line

February 6, 2009
Ken Lewis - B of A

Ken Lewis - Bank of America

Lloyd C Blankfein-$68.5 million; Kenneth D. Lewis-$24.8 million; James Dimon-27.8 million; John Mack-$800,000. These are the CEOs of Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley, respectively-all companies that have taken significant aid from the government’s TARP program. And those huge numbers represent their total compensation packages from the past year, even as their companies posted a combined $52 billion decline in year-over-year earnings. With that kind of disparity and excess, many Americans have expressed disbelief and anger that these CEOs are being paid so much with so little apparent return to shareholders.

In response, the Obama Administration recently enacted executive compensation caps of $500,000 for all “senior leaders” whose companies take significant funds from TARP (the government’s relief bailout program). This is a well calculated political move, in that it speaks directly to the public outrage surrounding these men, but may have devastating long-term ideological and practical consequences. Are these men overpaid? Probably. But the question should not be whether or not these men are overpaid, as has been the focus of so much media and political attention. Rather, the debate should focus on who should decide the compensation packages of these men: The free market or the government? Whenever the free market collides with partial regulation, unintended consequences result.

Consider the following:

Let’s say the Baltimore Orioles, Cincinnati Reds, and Oakland Athletics all had such terrible records and attendance last year that they are on the verge of bankruptcy. Knowing that the loss of such historic franchises would greatly damage Major League Baseball and its fans, the MLB officials decide to bailout each team with a large infusion of money. The terms of the bailout, however, require that no player on any of the three teams make more than $500,000 per year. If the teams are losing so many games, and aren’t generating revenue, why should any of the players make a fortune? Consider also that the average salary for a top MLB player is approximately $5 million per year. The next season, all of the teams’ top talent come up for free agency, and leave to go to other teams in the league that can pay them their true market value. The three bailout teams were already terrible-now their best players have left to go to teams willing and able to pay them. Soon after, with continually poor records and declining fan bases, all three teams fold.

Limiting executive pay sounds like a great idea on paper, but in the end it sets a dangerous precedent, and only further hurts struggling firms. We are already seeing this with TARP companies. AIG, for example, has seen a well documented outflow of its senior talent to competitor firms, and is now struggling to weather the crisis. This pattern will repeat again and again if applied. Whether it is human talent or industrial goods, the market will always guide the greatest supply to the greatest demand.

This is not to mention, of course, that CEOs all answer to a board of directors and a mass of shareholders. If they want to compensate their leaders at such high rates, it is their choice. If an owner of a baseball team wants to pay a player a huge salary, even overpay him, it is the owner’s choice. If the fans don’t like it, they can stop going to the games. If the shareholders don’t like it, they can sell the stock or elect a new board of directors.

Finally, it has become popular to say that since taxpayer money is funding these men, the government has the right to intervene. But that’s simply not true. Taxpayer money is funding the capital, credit, and toxic assets on the books of these companies, not employee salary. And if we are comfortable saying the CEOs are overpaid, what about the mid-level manager who makes $100,000 a year and is also seemingly under-performing? Should we slice his salary in half? I certainly understand and share the outrage at the excess-especially with $80,000 office rugs and multi-million dollar private jets-but we walk a dangerous line when we want the government to control company spending.

We can debate the merits of each leader, and chronicle spending indiscretion endlessly. But the fact remains that unless you impose a nationwide salary cap, the merits of which wilt under any capitalist consideration, the plan will only hurt shareholders, and eventually the country.  It is not for us or the government to decide what these men should be paid. Is the public outrage justified? Yes, but it is misplaced. If you think these men are overpaid, blame the board of directors and the shareholders that elected them, not the government.

-Matt Benchener from TruPolitics.net

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